LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Are the present protection-level dosimetry quantities good enough?
Dear Sir At the SRP meeting on 'Dosimetry-Requirements and Practice', held in Dartington Hall on 20 June 2007, one speaker, Phil Gilvin (HPA), included a statement that the subject of quantities 'was no longer an issue'. In the subsequent question period, I took issue with this statement in view of the present situation in respect of the ICRP 'effective' dose quantities for dose limitation purposes, along with the ICRU 'operational' quantities for measurement purposes-the latter providing indicators for the former. Invited to respond from the platform, Pete Burgess (NPL) provided an example of practical difficulties in personnel monitoring, implying that any further refinement of such quantities would not be warranted.
I cannot accept that we are at the end of the road in the quest, as I concluded in my paper entitled 'Evolution over the past century of quantities and units in radiation dosimetry', published in the March issue of this journal (2007 J. Radiol. Prot. 27 5-16) . Anyone who has read that paper will appreciate the problems encountered by the two Commissions in their respective endeavours to devise quantities which are both meaningful and practical, let alone subject to measurement, at protection levels.
Two members of the ICRU Fundamental Quantities and Units Committee have recently prepared a draft discussion paper, entitled 'Considerations of the operational quantities for monitoring external radiation exposure' for the attention of that Committee. That paper provides a thorough analysis pointing to problems and deficiencies in the present position, including the need for more data in some instances, and it presents some proposals for improving the situation. Various solutions and options are put forward for discussion. It is evident that there are still issues to be addressed.
However, if any proposed changes impinge on existing regulations, and bearing in mind the recent approval by ICRP of their new fundamental recommendations on radiological protection, such changes will clearly need to be warranted.
Yours sincerely,
W Alan Jennings
Review of the HSE's Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities
Dear Sir I have read Alan Martin's book review of the HSE's Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities, 2006 edition (www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/saps/saps2006), in J. Radiol. Prot. 27 (2007) 199. As project manager for the later stages of this work, I appreciate his recognition of the progress we have made with our revised SAPs and would like to elaborate on some of the points he makes.
Firstly, we have noted the error in Target 4 of giving the BSO as per annum and intend to correct it, with a few other minor errors, when we issue a revised version in the near future.
Secondly, it is suggested that an additional Fundamental Principle that 'Compliance with the above principles must be demonstrated . . . ' should be added. We do not believe this is necessary as it is implicit that the Fundamental Principles should be met and the subsequent principles are guidance derived from them. As is explained in several places, e.g. paragraph 14, the SAPs are principles to aid judgement which 'is always subject to ALARP'. This paragragh also states that 'priority should be given to achieving an overall balance of safety rather than satisfying each principle'.
Thirdly, Alan suggests that the Numerical Targets and Legal Limits section is a 'key section . . . in judging . . . demonstrat[ion of] ALARP'. We have tried to emphasise that meeting 'relevant good practice in engineering and operational safety management is of prime importance' (paragraph 10). Numerical targets are part of the process of demonstrating ALARP, but unless engineering and operational standards are high, numerical risk estimates are not on their own sufficient to make the demonstration. The Engineering Principles are a crucial feature of the SAPs. They are headed by five Key Engineering Principles which form the bedrock for a good design, and addressing these provides a sound basis for demonstrating ALARP. HSE has published several guidance documents on ALARP which can be accessed on its website at www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarp.htm.
Finally, Alan uses the terms 'unacceptable, tolerable and acceptable' in describing the numerical targets and legal limits. We have moved away from this description of the Basic Safety Level (BSL) and Basic Safety Objective (BSO) structure as we feel it may oversimplify complex judgements and hence have the potential to be misleading. SAPs paragraphs 571 to 573 expand on our usage of these terms. However, I would like to emphasise one point: BSOs are purely for the use of the Inspectorate in determining when to move resources to other problems; licensees must always consider the possibility of providing a higher standard of safety if it would not be grossly disproportionate to do so.
Yours faithfully,
Geoff Vaughan HM Superintending Inspector of Nuclear Installations
Reply to 'Review of the HSE's Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities'
Dear Sir I would like to thank Geoff Vaughan for responding to my review. The SAPs are of fundamental importance to the nuclear industry and any clarification is helpful.
With regard to my assertion that 'a key section of the SAPs is that setting out the numerical targets and legal limits for dose and risk . . . ', I feel that most people involved in safety assessment would agree. It is described as a key section, not the key section. However, I accept that good engineering practice is of prime importance. The section on engineering principles comprises the larger part of the document and I regret that this was not covered in my review.
I have some difficulty understanding his objection to my use of the terms 'unacceptable, tolerable and acceptable' since most of the words come directly from the SAPs. Paragraph 569 of the SAPs states that the structure of targets and legal limits is based on the TOR and R2P2 frameworks and that the BSL and BSO are used in translating this framework into targets. Paragraph 579 sets out the ranges of risk which are considered to fall within these categories. My review brought out the requirement that irrespective of BSL and BSO, doses and risks must be shown to be ALARP. I also make clear that the BSO represent benchmarks that reflect modern nuclear safety standards and expectations. If the HSE considers that the BSO are intended only for the use of the Inspectorate, they could hardly be described as targets. However, in my view, designers and safety assessors do find it useful to regard them as targets whilst accepting that the ALARP requirement still applies.
Yours sincerely,
Alan Martin alanmartinassoc@aol.com
RBE and w R values of sparsely ionising radiations
Dear Sir
While we would not agree completely with everything that Fairlie says in his paper 'RBE and w R values of Auger emitters and low-range beta emitters with particular reference to tritium' (Fairlie 2007) , the paper does highlight an important problem for radiological protection which deserves serious discussion, review and revision. The ICRP 92 (ICRP 2004) recommended value of unity for the w R of all photons and electrons coupled with the stated preference for hard gamma rays as the reference radiation needs to be reassessed.
Fairlie has argued for a reassessment of w R and RBE values especially from the point of view of Auger emitters and low-range beta emitters but we feel that there are good grounds for including all sparsely ionising radiations in that reassessment.
In our opinion, the choice of hard gamma rays as the reference radiation is appropriate because the most complete epidemiological data on cancer induction in the atomic bomb survivors are associated with hard gamma rays and these have the lowest LET. The derivation of RBE and subsequently w R for other sparsely ionising radiations will be difficult, if not impossible, using epidemiological or animal data on cancer induction. It will therefore be necessary to use cellular data, which we believe to be entirely appropriate if certain precautions are taken. RBE, as defined, is normally a function of radiation dose because of the non-linearity of dose-effect curves for acute exposures, but the relevant value for radiological protection is the maximum value (RBE 0 ), determined as the ratio of the initial slopes of the doseeffect curves (α-values in the linear-quadratic analysis) for the test and reference radiation. Data analysis and future experimentation should take this into account. Interestingly, as dose increases, RBE decreases and will approach unity for many sparsely ionising radiations in acute exposures; this might explain, to some extent, the early choice by ICRP of RBE = 1 for all sparsely ionising radiations. As Fairlie quotes, "ICRP Publication 92 noted RBE differences of two to three between conventional x-rays and hard gamma rays, with the former being more effective." We expect that the softer the x-ray spectrum is, the higher the RBE 0 will prove to be. This somewhat counter-intuitive feature might not be thoroughly appreciated in radiological medicine where a large proportion of public exposure occurs to soft x-rays and beta emitters at low doses. We think that this is an important point which needs to be addressed.
Fairlie has, quite rightly, drawn attention to a problem that deserves a complete reassessment by the radiological protection community and ICRP in particular. We believe that this reassessment should not be restricted only to Auger emitters and low-range beta emitters but should include all sparsely ionising radiations.
